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Compare to other ﬁrms, banks are special in three ways. First, most banks are insured by
deposit insurance. Second, banking industry is highly regulated. Third, banks are ﬁnancial
intermediary. To attract deposits is one of a bank’s main functions, and deposits compose
the most part of a bank’s debt. Among the various regulations, minimum capital require-
ments play an important role, which require banks to keep their capital-to-asset ratio above
a certain amount. Usually the minimum capital requirements are considered as a remedy of
the deposit insurance. In banking system, deposit insurance can be purchased from the gov-
ernmental insurance agency–the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(FDIC). Although
banks are not commanded to join the FDIC, most banks have the membership. In the
beginning of the FDIC history, member banks obtained full coverage on deposit at a quite
low premium. Later, the eﬀective premium increased while coverage were cut down, how-
ever, the premium explicitly paid was still ignorable compared to the big amount of deposit
coverage
1. After risk-based premium system was originally established, 75% banks were
in the best-rated category. This percentage of best-rated banks increased to 93% in 2000.
These best-rated banks pay no premium for deposit insurance.
It should not be surprising if banks take advantage of this ”generous” insurance system.
According to moral hazard theory, an insurant tends to be less careful about their risky
behavior since he can leave the loss to the insurer. This moral hazard behavior is often seen
especially when insurance is not correctly priced. Under the protection of the FDIC, banks
have incentive to take deposits as much as they can for some debt-favor reasons such as tax
deduction on interest payment, and let the FDIC pay for the deposits if it turns out banks
do not have enough capital to pay the deposits back. As a matter of fact, the average bank
capital ratio had decreased from 13% to 6% during the ﬁrst decade after deposit insurance
became eﬀective. However, the capital ratio had begun to fall steadily from more than
50% since 1840, long time before the FDIC was established. This casts some doubts on the
criticism of the deposit insurance.
1970s witnessed another mild decrease in capital ratio of banks in the U.S. Meanwhile, the
number of failed banks rose slightly. In 1981 the regulator, for the ﬁrst time, implemented
explicit capital requirements in hope of preventing bank crisis. They required all the
Key words and phrases. Capital requirements, Deposit insurance, Capital ratio, Risk-taking.
1Before 1990, the nominal assessment rate was ﬁxed at 8.3 basis points. Due to the refund system, the
eﬀective rate before 1983 was even lower. Before 1980 the eﬀective rate had been less than 4.0 basis points
for 30 years except 1974. From 1990 to 1995, this rate increased dramatically to more than 20 basis points.
However, it dropped later to a very low level, i.e. less than 0.5 basis point.
1commercial banks to keep their capital ratios above a one-for-all minimum ratio. The
reasoning of these capital requirements is very simple. A bank’s operation can be ﬁnanced
either by its creditors (mainly depositors) or equityholders (its owners). If funds from
creditors are not paid when due, it can cause the bank to fail. In contrast, funds from
equityholders are not obligations to the bank. Therefore, the greater the capital-to-asset
ratio, ”the more likely the bank will be able to continue to pay its obligations during periods
of economic adversity”
2.
However, the number of failed banks increased dramatically from 1981, and reached the
peak (280) in 1988. This may be taken as the support evidence for the main criticism.
Many researchers assert that the ﬁxed capital requirements will result in shift from low-
risk assets to high-risk assets. A binding regulation will bring some distortion to a ﬁrm.
Capital requirements might also distort a bank’s ﬁnancial decision. Since bank risk is not
incorporated in the ﬁxed capital requirements, a bank could have some compensation for
the regulatory distortion from its investment by taking riskier portfolio. This argument
implies higher probability of bank failure. Thus the increase in the number of failed banks
after 1981 makes this argument sound plausible. However, the whole economy was not in
good condition in 1970s to 1980s. ”On the economic front, soaring interest rates and a
spike in oil prices instigated a worldwide recession in 1981”
3. The skyrocketing number of
failed banks might be attributed to some other market factors.
In any case, improvements were called for later for these ﬁxed capital requirements.
Basel Accord I (1988) was brought into eﬀect nation wide in 1992, which adopted risk-
based capital requirements. Under the 1988 Accord, bank assets and oﬀ-balance-sheet
items are ”risk-weighted” based on their perceived credit risk using four broad categories
4.
Although this 1988 Accord also requires all banks to hold a one-for-all capital ratio (8%),
the total amount of capital required is diﬀerent across banks depending on their credit
risks. The higher the credit risk, the more total amount of capital the bank has to hold.
However, it ”does not penalize them for holding less risky portfolios”
5. Meanwhile, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was enacted in 1991. Similarly,
this act categorizes banks into ”well capitalized” group and low capital group. Banks
are undercapitalized ”have restrictions or conditions on certain activities and may also be
subject to mandatory or discretionary supervisory actions”
6.
The logic of adopting risk-based capital requirements is that a bank needs more capital
to support its solvency if it incurs more risk. Compared to ﬁxed capital requirements,
these risk-based capital requirements are more risk sensitive. However, some researcher
ﬁnd that banks might shift priced risks to non-priced risks. In the 1988 risk-based capital
2Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, Story Archive of
NuBank, FDIC Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs, Jan, 2003.
3Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, Story Archive of
NuBank, FDIC Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs, Jan, 2003.
4Most claims are risk-weighted at 100%, although residential mortgages are weighted at 50%, claims
on or guarantees provided by qualifying banks and other entities (in the U.S. this category includes most
notably the government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are weighted at 20%,
and very low risk assets, such as those guaranteed by qualifying governments, are weighted at 0%.
5Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, Story Archive of
NuBank, FDIC Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs, Jan, 2003.
6Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, Story Archive of
NuBank, FDIC Oﬃce of Public Aﬀairs, Jan, 2003.
2requirements, only credit risk is captured roughly. In this case, banks have incentives
to move to assets with low credit risk but high other risks. Thus, actually this risk-based
capital requirements will lead to higher total risk of banks, and hence the higher probability
of bank failure. Nevertheless, these risk-based capital requirements are still eﬀective today,
and seem working well. The number of failed banks dropped quickly after 1992, when the
risk-based capital requirements took full eﬀect nation wide.
How on earth will capital requirements aﬀect bank risk-taking behavior? How will banks
change their capital structure and risk-taking behavior in an environment with both deposit
insurance and capital requirements? What diﬀerence will the risk-based capital require-
ments make? Actually, before the formal capital requirements debuted in 1981, banks were
closely monitored by their insurer–the FDIC. Banks did not run into any crisis like 1980s
and early 1990s. Even during the ﬁrst decade of the FDIC was established, the number
of failed banks was no more than 75 each year. Under the deposit insurance, why banks
stayed stable for almost 40 years without explicit capital regulation? Do we really need
explicit capital requirements?
In this paper, I investigate how banks react to the ﬁxed and risk-based capital require-
ments under deposit insurance. I adopt one factor option pricing model to evaluate bank
equity in terms of asset-to-debt ratio. I ﬁnd banks beneﬁt from using more capital even
there are no capital requirements. Moreover, banks tend to take lower risk instead of high
risk no matter there are capital requirements or not, if they are solvent. However, for
insolvent banks, they may take riskier investment. Under the risk-based capital require-
ments, banks would prefer lower capital requirements by taking lower risk. Lastly, capital
requirements only have impact on banks with low capital. For those well capitalized banks,
capital requirements will not aﬀect their behavior too much.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the existing literature on bank
capital and risk-taking. In section 3, I set up the option pricing model for equity value and
derive the closed form solutions. This section also presents comparative statics analysis
and some numerical results. In concluding section 6, I discuss some implications of my
model.
2. Literature Review
One of the most cited theory for bank behavior comes from moral hazard. As it is
well known, moral hazard theory is often used in explaining the distorted behavior due to
insurance. Under the protection of insurance, it sounds plausible that banks will tend to
increase deposits and hence decrease capital ratio. However, this moral hazard explanation
is based on the assumption that banks pay little or no cost when bankruptcy occurs due to
overabundant debt. Thus debt is more favorable than equity under the deposit insurance.
Concerning the preference between equity and debt, immense capital structure studies
have provided all sorts of explanations. The ﬁrst work in capital structure was done by
Modigliani and Miller in 1958(Modigliani and Miller 1958). They argue that ﬁrm value is
irrelevant to how it is ﬁnanced. However, their famous ”irrelevant theorem” is derived in a
highly simpliﬁed situation with a long list of restricted explicit and implicit assumptions.
A great deal of studies have followed starting from relaxing those assumptions one by one.
Most of them show that once these stringent assumptions are relaxed, capital structure is
relevant to the value of ﬁrm. Basically, the key assumptions that change the M&M theorem
3are the following: 1) there are no taxes; 2) there are no bankruptcy costs; 3) there are no
transaction costs; 4) market is complete and information is symmetric.
Generally speaking, tax deduction on interest payment makes debt more favorable, while
bankruptcy costs make equity more attractive. The more the debt is used, the higher
probability of bankruptcy, and the more bankruptcy costs. Tax deduction on the interest
payment will prompt banks to use deposits as much as possible, and leave the possible
bankruptcy burden to the FDIC. However, moral hazard explanation ignores the implicit
bankruptcy costs. Some studies show that explicit bankruptcy costs are not of signiﬁcant
amount. However, bankruptcy event may incur some implicit costs, which are usually in the
form of opportunity costs. If a bank goes to bankruptcy, even not considering the deposit
repayment, equity at best has only zero value. To bank equityholders, the opportunity
costs of bankruptcy involve two parts: possible earnings from continuous operation and the
protection of the FDIC. A solvent bank may have great chance of future earnings. However,
once an insolvent bank is claimed bankrupt, it will lose all the possible future earnings. This
constitutes implicit bankruptcy cost to equityholders. Moreover, once a bank is claimed
bankrupt, the FDIC will pay for the remaining deposits. However, this is one-time payment.
Equityholders will lose the beneﬁt from the deposit insurance permanently. The loss of
deposit insurance also constitutes explicit bankruptcy cost to equityholders. After taking
into consideration of these implicit bankruptcy costs, debt use is not as attractive as moral
hazard theory predicts.
On the other hand, moral hazard is also employed to explain risk-taking behavior. The
logic is similar. For an insured bank, deposit insurance provides a shelter for risk transfer.
With the guarantee from the FDIC, shareholders could be less risk averse, and increase
credit risk in hope of gaining higher return. Hence, moral hazard theory predicts that
banks will take higher credit risk. Therefore, if moral hazard prevails, deposit insurance
will lead to lower capital ratios and higher credit risk. This may constitute the base of the
risk-based capital requirements debuted nation wide in 1992. One of the major criticisms
of the 1981 ﬁxed capital requirements is that they do not capture any risk elements.
Nevertheless, this moral hazard explanation for risk-taking is subject to some criticisms.
As mentioned above, it ignore the implicit costs of bankruptcy. The shareholders would
like to maximize the equity value as well as to avoid bankruptcy. Hence, under capital
requirements, banks should not change risk-taking behavior too much in order to balance
the bankruptcy risk that is borne by the bank equityholders. Moreover, some empirical
studies show diﬀerent results than the prediction by moral hazard on bank capital ratio
and risk-taking. For instance, Keeley and Furlong (1990) use the data of 1970-1986 to show
that risk-taking declines while capital increases.
The moral hazard theory without considering implicit bankruptcy costs does not provide
a complete explanation for bank capital structure and risk-taking behavior. The implicit
costs of bankruptcy will discourage risk-taking behavior and deposit taking. There are
several ways to accomodate this factor. Portfolio analysis is one of them. This is a util-
ity maximizing framework. A bank is assumed to behavior like a risk averse manager.
Both return and risk are variables of the bank’s objective function. Thus, an increase in
bankruptcy risk leads to a decrease in utility. Rochet (1992) compares value maximizing
approach and this utility maximizing approach. He ﬁnds that in the former framework,
capital requirements cannot prevent banks from choosing very specialized and very risky
portfolio. However, capital requirements may achieve the goal in the latter framework.
4It is the induction of risk that induces the eﬀectiveness of capital requirements. Similar
studies include Kareken and Wallace (1978), Koehn and Santomero (1980), and Kim and
Santomero (1988). Portfolio analysis is a general but complicated framework. To obtain
the interpretable results, equity is assumed to be ﬁxed. However, it is not a reasonable
assumption for marketable equity. This simpliﬁcation actually throws away some market
factors that could signiﬁcantly aﬀect the capital structure and risk-taking.
Calem (1999) establishes a dynamic portfolio choice model for bank risk-taking study.
He ﬁnds a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank’s capital
increases it ﬁrst take less risk, then more risk. Hence, he argues that an increased ﬁxed
or risk-based capital requirement will induce more risk-taking by well-capitalized banks.
Although Calem does not assume ﬁxed equity, he assumes a ﬁxed value for total assets,
which is equal to the sum of equity and deposits. This may be a logical assumption for
general ﬁrms, however, it is not an appropriate assumption to banks for two reasons. First
of all, this assumption ignore the value of deposit insurance. Unlike other ﬁrms, deposit
insurance is also a valuable asset to banks. In the case of bankruptcy, bank debtholders
(mainly depositors) still can have their claims back. Hence the value of deposit insurance
should be taken into account in the valuation of total assets. Secondly, the ﬁxed sum of
equity and deposits implies that a bank can only increase capital ratio by reducing deposits.
This imposes a over-stringent constrain on bank capital structure.
Another risk-related approach is state preferences model, which has been developed by
Sharpe (1978), Karekan and Wallace (1978), and Dothan and Williams (1980), etc. In
a state preference model, there are several possible states in the future. A bank in this
model is seeking to maximize its equity value, which is just the expected value of capital
at current time when the bank is solvent. However, the equity value becomes the sum of
the current capital value and current deposit insurance value when the bank is insolvent.
Using the similar framework, Furlong and Keeley (1989) reach the conclusion that a
higher bank capital ratio does not lead a value-maximizing bank to increase asset risk. On
the contrary, more stringent capital requirements reduce the gains of a bank from increasing
the risk of its asset portfolio. This conclusion is opposite to the results from foregoing
studies using portfolio framework, such as Kahane (1977), and Koehn and Santomero
(1980). Keeley and Furlong (1990) point out it is because of one of the assumptions
in portfolio framework. In portfolio framework, it is assumed that the returns follows
a normal distribution. However, it cannot be true in the case of insolvency. Keeley and
Furlong truncate the normal distribution, and show a similar result to their state preference
framework. Keeley and Furlong (1989) also use a third approach–option pricing model–to
reach the similar conclusion.
Option pricing model originates from an idea similar to state preference model: to eval-
uate the market price of equity. Since Black and Scholes (1971) ﬁrst derive a closed form
solution to call option, it has been spread widely in various issues. Capital liabilities might
be its ﬁrst major development (Merton 1998). However, this approach has not shed too
much light on the analysis of risk-taking behavior. In this approach, debt is comparable
to a put option, while equity is considered as a call option. Hence, both debt and equity
can be evaluated using the option pricing model. Following Black and Scholes’ methodol-
ogy, Brennan and Schwartz (1978) show the non-monotonicity of capital structure with the
presence of taxes through a numerical analysis of a stochastic diﬀerential equation. They
show that even without bankruptcy costs, tax deduction on interest payment will yield an
5interior optimal capital ratio. This result is diﬀerent than the classic conclusion that tax
beneﬁt will stimulate debt use as much as possible if there are no bankruptcy costs.
Leland (1994), enlightened by the same spirit, ﬁnds a closed form solution to the price
of ﬁrm. He demonstrates the optimal capital structure under tax beneﬁt and bankruptcy
costs. Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989)also use the option pricing framework to derive
the price of debt and equity with tax beneﬁt and bankruptcy costs under the assumption
that recapitalization costs are not ignorable. However, they do not replicate Brennan
and Schwartz’s result. In my opinion, Brennan and Schwartz actually take into account
implicit bankruptcy costs by allowing diﬀerent tax rate at bankruptcy. They introduce a
non-constant tax scheme, i.e. tax rates are conditional on the performance. In Brennan
and Schwartz’s model, tax rate is positive only when the value of total asset is greater the
book value of debt. In this case, tax beneﬁt is in fact aﬀected by bankruptcy, although
there are no explicit bankruptcy costs. We can also considered the tax beneﬁt as a type of
implicit bankruptcy costs.
To apply the Black-Scholes option pricing model on banks, however, we also need to
take into account deposit insurance and capital requirements. With deposit insurance,
depositors have the right to sell their claims to the FDIC at the contract price when asset
value is less than deposit value. Therefore, we can consider deposit insurance as a put
option to depositors.
Merton (1977) might be the ﬁrst to apply the Black-Scholes put option formula directly
on banks. He (1978) extends the previous deposit insurance model into a model with
explicit surveillance costs occurring at random auditing times. He ﬁnds that the equity
per unit of deposit is a monotonically increasing function of the asset-to-deposit ratio, and
strictly concave when the ratio is over 1. Thus a bank under deposit insurance should
beneﬁt from taking more capital. Moreover, he argues that a solvent bank tend to take
less risk due to the fear of losing valuable deposit insurance. This factor is an element of
implicit bankruptcy costs.
Like state preference model, equityholders are supposed to ”pay” for the put option of
the deposit insurance in Merton’s option pricing model. However, depositors instead of
equityholders are the beneﬁciary of the deposit insurance: When the bank is bankrupt,
depositors have the right to exercise the put option and get their claims paid. Why should
equityholders pay for the deposit insurance? Merton does not provide a clear explanation.
Moreover, to derive the closed form solution for the equity value per unit of deposits,
Merton makes two assumptions, which seem unnecessary to me. The ﬁrst is asset return
dynamics satisfy the Capital Asset Pricing Model(CAPM). The second is the growth rate
of deposits is just equal to the interest rate paid by the bank plus the rate paid in form of
service.
Marcus and Shaked (1958) calibrate Merton’s model to derive the fair premium for FDIC
deposit insurance. They ﬁnd the FDIC premium is actually greater than what is warranted
by the ex ante default risk posed by the banks. This implies that the deposit insurance
is overpriced rather than underpriced. Then why do banks voluntarily pay for the ”over-
priced” deposit insurance? From my point of view, this question and the previous question
are closely related. The answer comes from implicit bankruptcy costs that are ignored in
Marcus and Shaked’s paper. Actually, there are two components in the explicit insurance
premium paid by banks: the value of deposit insurance derived by Marcus and Shaked and
6the increase in equity value through an implicit protection of the FDIC. Although depos-
itors rather than equityholders are the direct beneﬁciary of the FDIC when bankruptcy
occurs, equity value is enhanced if a bank is insured. On one hand, depositors obtain the
option of deposit insurance and pay for this right by receiving less interest. On the other
hand, equityholders have higher value of their claim by being a member of the FDIC. Thus
bank equity should be priced incorporating implicit protection of the FDIC. If a bank is
claimed bankruptcy, the equityholders will lose this implicit beneﬁt that can be counted as
opportunity costs of bankruptcy. Hence, depositors and equityholders jointly pay for the
deposit insurance. Marcus and Shaked do not consider the implicit costs of bankruptcy,
therefore, they achieve an ”overpriced” deposit insurance.
Marcus (1984) modiﬁes Merton (1978)’s model of banks with deposit insurance. He takes
into account a non-negative charter value in his model. The model shows that if there is
a valuable charter, a value maximizing bank will show extreme risk-taking behavior: take
either very low risk or very high risk. In my opinion, the charter value also constitutes
implicit costs of bankruptcy. In my model, I show that even there is no valuable charter, a
value maximizing bank will not exploit deposit insurance by taking high risk. It is because
there are other types of implicit bankruptcy costs.
The last approach is dynamic programming, which is rarely used so far. Milne and
Whalley (2001) are one the few who use this approach. The advantage to use dynamic
programming is that it allows endogeny of risk-taking and capital ratio. Moreover, dy-
namic framework allows the representative bank to set up a diﬀerent long-run goal. This
matches our intuition very well. However, it is more technic involved. Actually, the essen-
tial diﬀerence between option pricing model and dynamic programming model is that the
former assume a general equilibrium environment, while the latter is set to reach a partial
equilibrium. This will not aﬀect the result too much. Hence, I opt for option pricing model.
In my paper, I withdraw some elements from Merton’s model. However, I relax these two
assumptions in Merton’s model. I have also derived a closed form solution. Furthermore,
I assume a bank is seeking to maximize its total value of equity, instead of the equity per
unit of deposits. Merton uses equity per unit of deposits for simplicity reason, however,
the total value maximizing is more reasonable assumption.
3. Model
As mentioned above, like debt and equity of many other ﬁrms, debt and equity of banks
can also be viewed as options. In general ﬁrms, debt is risky since it is subject to default.
If ﬁrm value is less than debt value at maturity, then the creditors have the ﬁrst priority of
being paid. Due to the limited liability, however, creditors are only paid up to the current
value of the ﬁrm. Hence, with the limited liability policy, levered ﬁrms actually short a put
option worth the diﬀerence between debt value and the ﬁrm value. If ﬁrm value exceeds
the debt value at maturity, then the ﬁrm pay the creditors the full amount and the option
is worth nothing. Hence, the risky debt can be taken as default-free debt plus a short
position of a put option. On the other hand, equity is the residual claims. As a result of
the limited liability, the value of equity is either zero or the excess of the ﬁrm value over
the debt value at maturity. Thus equity can be taken as a call option. Hereby,the ﬁrm
value at maturity is always equal to the default-free debt value less a put option and plus
equity value. If we use V to represent the value of the whole ﬁrm, B to represent the value
7default-free debt, P to represent the value of the put option, and S to represent the value
of equity, then the above argument can be expressed as V = (B − P) + S.
Generally speaking, risk-free debt is not achievable for ﬁrms. However, banks are an
exceptional case. In order to keep the stability of the society, a government will not allow
default on deposits to occur. Although not all deposits are insured, and the FDIC does not
claim 100% coverage of the deposits now, deposits in banks are usually considered backed
by the government and hence are considered default-free. In this case, deposit insurance can
be viewed as the put option, since the deposit insurance give the equityholders an option
to sell the deposits to the FDIC at price B. Hence, deposit insurance replaces limited
liability policy in the equation above. As mentioned earlier, equity value is boosted by
deposit insurance, and the value of deposit insurance includes the increase of equity value
and explicit insurance premium. Therefore, the put option value P = IP −∆S, where IP
represents insurance premium, and ∆S represents the increase of equity value due to the
deposit insurance. Thus, the equation above can be rewritten as V = (B−IP)+(S+∆S).
This equation shows that depositors obtain default-free claim at the cost of insurance
premium; while what equityholders pay is implicit costs that already reﬂect in S + ∆S.
For a value-maximizing bank, equityholders maximize their equity value, S + ∆S.
3.1. Assumptions of the Model. To develop a option pricing model, I make some as-
sumptions as follows.
Assumption 1: There exists a complete and competitive market. Investors can
borrow and lend at the same risk-free interest rate r.
Assumption 2: All securities can be traded continuously in time.
Assumption 3: All deposits are paid at interest rate i. This interest rate includes
pecuniary interest payment and services provided by the bank. To
avoid arbitrage, r ≥ i. Otherwise, no investors will make transaction
in the market. The diﬀerence between r and i can be considered as
some uncharged convenience provided by banks.
Assumption 4: The deposits of the bank follow a deterministic growth path
dD/dt = gD.
Assumption 5: Deposits are the only type of debt in the bank.
Assumption 6: The value of the bank, V , follows a stochastic process of the form
(3.1) dV = (µV − iD)dt + dD + σV dw =

(µV − (i − g)D)dt + σV dw V > 0
0 V = 0
where E[dw] = 0, E[(dw)2] = dt; µ is the instantaneous expected rate
of return on the assets; and σ is the instantaneous standard deviation
of the return on the assets.
Assumption 7: The FDIC charges the bank a one-time premium to insure all the
deposits. If the bank is solvent at audit time, i.e. V > D, then the
bank continues its normal business. Otherwise, the bank is liquidated
by the regulator.
Assumption 8: The FDIC premium is fairly priced.
8Assumption 9: The regulator audits the bank discretely in time following Poisson
distribution with parameter λ, which means that the mean of the num-
ber of audits per time period is λ. All audit events occur independently
and identically distributed7.
Assumption 10: The bank does not pay any dividends.
Assumption 11: The objective of the bank is to maximize the value of equity for
the current equityholders.
3.2. The Evaluation of Bank Equity under the Capital Requirements. As men-
tioned above, equity can be viewed as a call option. Hence I start with a standard call
option pricing model by creating a hedge portfolio.
Construct a portfolio worth P dollars by investing N1 shares of the bank assets V (D,t),
N2 shares of the bank equity denoted as F, and lent the remaining dollars denoted as Q at
the market rate r. Then
(3.2) P = N1V (D,t) + N2F(V,D,t) + Q(t).
Since F is a function of V , D and t, by Ito’s lemma,





2FV V + gDFD}dt + FVσV dw
Adjust N1 and N2 slowly relative to the change in V , D and t so that dN1 = dN2 = 0.
Hence,
dP = N1(dV ) + N2(dF) + dQ
= N1(µV − (i − g)D)dt + σV dw)





2FV V + gDFD}dt + FVσV dw) + rQdt. (3.4)






































FVσV dw) = 0.
7In reality, regulators usually provides random audits on banks. Merton (1978)assumes a Poisson dis-
tribution for audit procedure. Here I follow his assumption.
8Since the value of bank assets V has a stochastic element, it is diﬃcult to eliminate the risk completely.
However, this process can be performed carefully to achieve appropriate approximation.








which is equivalent to
(3.8) N1 = −N2FV.
















2FV V + gDFD}dt + r
Q
P
dt = rdt. (3.9)
Substitute equation (3.8) into equation (3.9) and rearrange the equation, I obtain the







2FV V + rV FV + gDFD + Ft − rF = 0.







2FV V + rV FV + gDFD − rF = 0.
To derive this PDE, I actually assume the bank is solvent at the auditing time, i.e.
V > D. In this case, an audit does not aﬀect the return on the no-arbitrage portfolio.
However, if the bank is insolvent at auditing time, the return of the portfolio will be
aﬀected. The total change is the sum of decrease in the return of the bank assets and
decrease in the return of the bank equity. After taking expectation of the loss and follow























dt = rdt. (3.13)
Simplify this equation using the no-arbitrage condition equation (3.8), the fundamental






2FV V + rV FV + gDFD − (r + λ)F = 0.
for V < D.
10Compare to the fundamental PDE for solvent bank, this equation can be interpreted as
follows: If the bank is insolvent during auditing time, it may be requested for bankruptcy.
As a result, the bank has to pay at higher required return rate: r + λ. However, if the
bank is solvent, the required return rate is only r. The higher required return rate, the low
the value. Hence, bank equity value is depressed when the bank is insolvent. Since there is
diﬀerence λ between required returns when the bank is solvent and insolvent, the implicit
bankruptcy costs can be considered as a monotonically increasing function of λ.
Therefore, at the equilibrium, the equity value F(V,D) must satisfy either of these two
PDEs (3.11 and (3.14). Note the equity value F is a function of asset value V , and deposit
value D. It can be converted into a function only with asset-to-debt, denoted as x = V/D.
































Substitute equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) into equations (3.11) and (3.14), then
the PDEs become ordinary diﬀerential equations. If there are no minimum capital require-
ments, x = V/D ∈ (0,∞). When x ≥ 1, V ≥ D, the bank is solvent; while when 0 < x < 1,






2Exx + (r − g)xEx − rE = 0.






2Exx + (r − g)xEx − (r + λ)E = 0.
for x ≤ 1.
These two ODEs are homogeneous Cauchy-Euler diﬀerential equations. The general
solution is
(3.20) E(x) = C1x
m1 + C2x
m2
where C1 and C2 are determined by boundary conditions; and
(3.21) m1 =
a2 − a1 +
p
a2





a2 − a1 −
p
a2










a1 = r − g (3.24)
a0 = −r (3.25)






a1 = r − g (3.27)
a0 = −(r + λ) (3.28)
for x ≤ 1
3.2.1. Without Capital Requirements. Solve the Cauchy-Euler diﬀerential equations with
the boundary conditions:
E2(0) = 0 (3.29)
lim
x→∞[E1(x)] ≤ Em, (3.30)
where E1 represents the solution for the solvent bank, E2 represents the solution for the
insolvent bank. When x = 0, the bank total asset is worth nothing, hereby the equity
has zero value. The second condition follows the assumption that the value of equity is
bounded. Moreover, to meet the continuity requirements, I impose another two conditions.






Thus I obtain the explicit solution for the value of bank equity when there are no capital
requirements.



















4 + σ2(r + g) + (r − g)2




4 + σ2(r + g + 2λ) + (r − g)2
σ2 > B1 > 0. (3.37)
3.2.2. Fixed Capital Requirements. In the case of ﬁxed capital requirements, each bank
faces a constant lower boundary on the capital ratio, denoted as c. In reality, capital ratios
are measured by book values. The book value of bank equity is the diﬀerence between V
and D. Thus c = Eb/V , while x = V/D = 1
D/V = 1
1−Eb/V . Obviously, asset-to-debt ratio
x is positively related to capital-to-asset ratio. Deﬁne x = 1
1−c. Then the boundary for x
becomes x ≥ x. Since 0 < c < 1, x > 1, it means that the bank cannot be insolvent. I only
need to solve equation (3.18) with the boundary condition
(3.38) E[x] = 0
Here I assume that a bank is liquidated once the bank does not meet the requirements
when audit is performed. This assumption is a little strict, but it shows the idea how
implicit costs are involved. In the case without capital requirements, bank equity value is
positive unless the asset-to-debt is zero. When ﬁxed capital requirements are imposed, the
bank loses positive value of equity even when the asset-to-debt is positive. Thus the bank
has to bear the some implicit opportunity costs if it wants to take lower capital ratio than
the required. In reality, a violating bank may not be liquidated. However, it will have to
face some punishments. For instance, it will be restricted to some loans. For simplicity, I
make this strict assumption.
Again use the general solution to homogeneous Cauchy-Euler diﬀerential equation with
diﬀerent boundary condition, the value of bank equity under a ﬁxed minimum capital ratio
is




where A and B1 are deﬁned in equations (3.35) and (3.36).
3.2.3. Risk-Based Capital requirements. In the case of risk-Based capital requirements, sup-
pose the regulator sets a link between portfolio risk and minimum capital ratio. Banks are
categorized into a number of groups according to their portfolio risks. Each group has
a corresponding minimum capital ratio. The higher the portfolio risk is, the higher the
minimum capital ratio is required. Without loss of generality, I assume that there are only
two risk categories. A bank can choose either (σ2
h,xh;ch) or (σ2
l ,xl;cl). h means higher
portfolio risk or higher capital requirements, while l means lower portfolio risk or lower
capital requirements. Then the corresponding equity values are













































A bank will choose the higher of Eh(x) or El(x).
3.3. Comparative Statics Analysis and Numerical Analysis.
3.3.1. Capital Structure. With the explicit form solution of the equity value, I use compar-
ative statics analysis to ﬁnd the impact of capital requirements in this section. First of all,
I investigate the case without capital requirements. The equity value comes from equations




= (A + B1)x













It is easily to see that the equity is a monotonically increasing function of asset-to-
debt ratio x, since B2 > B1 > 0,|B2| > |B1| > |A|. It implies that the bank intends to
take higher capital ratio under the deposit insurance even there are no capital requirements.
This conclusion is subject to the criticism that some debt-favor factors have not been taken
into this model, such as tax deduction. I will discuss this tax issue in the extension part.
However, actually taking into account tax will not change this result too much, especially
when capital ratio is low. The reason is that the implicit bankruptcy costs are more than
enough to oﬀset the tax beneﬁt from using debt. Hence, a bank will ﬁnance from their
own funds as much as possible, then turn to other means of ﬁnance. This implication is
diﬀerent from Myers and Majluf’s ”pecking order” (1984).
To bank equityholders, the diﬀerence between the ”protection” of deposit insurance
and limited liability is that equity value will rise with deposit insurance. However, when
bankruptcy occurs, equityholders cannot beneﬁt more from deposit insurance than limited
liability. Equityholders still have zero value equity. Similar to other uninsured ﬁrms,
reluctance of losing possible earnings plus fear of losing advantage of deposit insurance
drive a bank stay away from any risk of bankruptcy, such as immoderate debt use and
14taking high risk investment portfolio. I will probe into risk-taking behavior in the next
section.
Fixed capital requirements do not change this association too much. The ﬁrst order
derivative of the solution for the equity value under ﬁxed capital requirements shows that




= (A + B1)x
A+B1−1 − (A − B1)x
2B1x
A−B1−1
Figure 1 (insert ﬁgure 1) shows that equity value with ﬁxed capital requirements are
always below that without capital requirements. The diﬀerence between them is the reg-
ulation costs due to the distorted behavior under capital requirements, provided other
factors hold constant. However,as x (positively related to capital ratio c) increases, the eq-
uity values with and without capital requirements converge. This implies that risk capital
requirements only have impact on those undercapitalized banks.




dx2 = (A + B1)(A + B1 − 1)x













First, the second order derivatives in the case without capital requirements show that
the equity value is convex function of x when the bank is insolvent. However, it loses
this convexity for some intervals when x > 1. That means, when a bank is insolvent, the
marginal beneﬁt from capital increases at an ascending speed. Therefore, the bank is more
likely to take more capital to stay away from bankruptcy. Once it is solvent, however,
the marginal beneﬁt from capital ceases to increase at the ascending speed. Hence, the
equity value becomes concave for some x. Merton (1978) suggests that the concavity might
result from the positive spread of competitive market interest rate over the interest rate
paid by the bank. However, it is not obvious in my model. In my model, the convexity is
regained beyond some x. This pattern of transition also holds in the case of ﬁxed capital
requirements. This can be seen from the second order derivative of the equity value under
ﬁxed capital requirements as follows:
(3.51)
dE2(x)
dx2 = (A + B1)(A + B1 − 1)x
A+B1−2 − (A − B1)(A − B1 − 1)x
2B1x
A−B1−2
Figure 2 shows a numerical example when risk-based capital requirements are imposed.
This ﬁgure illustrates that higher minimum capital requirements yield lower equity value
if portfolio risk is the same. Moreover, the convergence of equity value between diﬀerent
combinations of portfolio risk and capital requirements conﬁrms the conclusion above: risk
capital requirements only have impact on those undercapitalized banks. This ﬁgure will be
revisited in the next section.
153.3.2. Risk-Taking Behavior. With regard to risk-taking behavior, comparative statics analy-
sis is also feasible. However, it is much easier to investigate it graphically. Figure 3 shows
a zoom-in picture of the equity value as a function of asset-to-debt ratio at diﬀerent risk
levels σ2 with and without capital requirements. When there are no capital requirements
and the bank equity is more than solvent (x > 1), the equity value is greater at lower
risk level. This is distinct from implication from standard option pricing model. If con-
tingent claim price is derived from the Black-Scholes’s model, the higher the volatility of
the underlying assets is, the higher the value is. However, here the underlying asset–bank
assets–is faced with some implicit bankruptcy costs. The possibility of losing the beneﬁt
from the FDIC and possible future earnings will rise, if the bank takes excessive portfolio
risk and hence increase the possibility of bankruptcy. It is the implicit bankruptcy costs
that change cause bank equity value to behave diﬀerent than other contingent claims. That
means bank equity value is depressed by the implicit bankruptcy costs.
However, it is interesting to note that in ﬁgure 3 bank equity value rises as portfolio risk
increases when the bank is far apart from solvency (x << 1), then falls as portfolio risk
increases when the bank approaches solvency from below, if there are no capital require-
ments. Mathematically, it is because the mean of the number of audits per time period λ is
added to the fundamental PDE when the bank is insolvent without capital requirements.
It is the the implicit bankruptcy costs as a monotonically increasing function of λ that
make a bank twist its attitude towards risk when it collapses from solvency to insolvency.
The twisting point is not at x = 1, but a little lower than x = 1.
The intuitive explanation for why the bank will take more risk when it is insolvent is the
following. When it is actually deep insolvent, taking extremely risky portfolio can either
result in bankruptcy or extremely high return. Since the bank is already found insolvent,
why not take the chance to recover. Thus, the bank tends to take riskier position when it
is far from solvency in hope of achieving higher return. As the bank gets closer and closer
to solvent position, it becomes more and more risk-averse. On one hand, it is because the
bank is about to recover, it does not need to take risky position. On the other hand, the
bank needs to be more prudential to prepare for the solvent situation and stay away from
bankruptcy.
These results partly conﬁrm Merton’s (1978) conclusion that a solvent bank is risk-averse
but a insolvent bank is aggressive in risk-taking. He explains this as follows: A bank pays
less than competitive market risk-free interest rate due to deposit insurance if the bank is
solvent. However, if the bank is insolvent, it also lose this valuable asset. An increase of
risk σ2 leads to higher probability of becoming insolvent. Therefore, to keep this valuable
deposit insurance, the bank should not take too much risk when it is solvent. Nevertheless,
when the bank becomes insolvent, it will take more risk in hope of getting over the deﬁcit
by taking high risk-high return investments.
Increase in λ moves the twisting point closer to x = 1. This implies that the higher
implicit bankruptcy costs have more incentive for risk-taking behavior when the bank is
insolvent, since a bank wants get rid of bankruptcy more exigently. Nevertheless, changing
λ does not have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the twisting asset-to-debt ratio x.
When ﬁxed capital requirements are imposed, the bank behaves similar to when it is
solvent without capital requirements. Since capital requirements must be set above the
insolvent level, a bank under capital requirements intends to take lower risk in order to
achieve higher equity value.
16Moreover, the convergence between the equity values with and without capital require-
ments indicates that risk-taking behavior is not aﬀected by risk-based capital requirements
as capital ratio increases.
It is not easy to see from the analytic solution which combination of risk and minimum
capital requirements yields the higher equity value. A numerical example in ﬁgure 2 illus-
trates how a bank chooses between high risk-high minimum capital requirements and low
risk-low minimum capital requirements. There are four combination of risk and minimum
capital requirements: low risk-low capital requirements, low risk-high capital requirements,
high risk-high capital requirements, and high risk-high capital requirements. Under the
same capital requirements, the higher the risk is the lower the equity value is. Hence, a
value-maximizing bank should take lower risk for the same capital requirements. On the
other hand, the higher the capital requirements are the lower the equity value is. This
implies that a bank should choose lower capital requirements for the same risk if it can.
As assumed above, a bank is faced with two combinations of risk and capital requirements,
either low risk-low capital requirements, or high risk-high capital requirements. From ﬁgure
2, the combination of low risk and low capital requirements combination yields the highest
equity value among four combinations, while the combination of high risk and high capital
requirements yields the lowest equity value. Therefore, a bank will deﬁnitely choose low
risk-low capital requirements rather than high risk-high capital requirements.
Figure 2 also shows that the combination of high risk and low capital requirements
yields higher equity value than the combination of low risk and high capital requirements
when asset-to-debt ratio is low. As asset-to-debt ratio increases, the equity value from
the combination of low risk and high capital requirements increases faster then the equity
value from the combination of high risk and low capital requirements. Eventually, the
combination of low risk and high capital requirements yields higher equity value than the
combination of high risk and low capital requirements. Hence, a well capitalized bank will
take lower risk portfolio even it has to keep higher capital ratio. Actually both of these two
combinations converge to the other two combinations based on their risk level respectively.
It conﬁrms that capital requirements do not aﬀect risk-taking behavior of a well-capitalized
bank. In short, these results imply that risk-based capital requirements will not lead to
more risk-taking.
4. Conclusion
Deposit insurance and capital requirements are two focuses in banking literature. Many
researchers criticize these two important schemes using moral hazard theory: Under the
protection of the deposit insurance, banks have incentive to take deposits as much as they
can for some debt-favor reasons such as tax deduction on interest payment, and let the
FDIC pay for the deposits if it turns out banks do not have enough capital to pay the
deposits back. One the other hand, banks also have incentive to take riskier investment
in hope of having higher returns. When capital requirements are imposed, insured banks
may shift priced risks to unpriced risks. Therefore, capital requirements actually will lead
banks to take more risks, and hence lead to higher probability of bank failure. However,
this criticism does not consider the implicit costs of bankruptcy. If a bank is bankrupt, it
will lose the beneﬁt of deposit insurance. Moreover, it will lose the possible future earnings.
In this paper, I take into account the implicit costs of bankruptcy, and investigate how
banks react to the ﬁxed and risk-based capital requirements under deposit insurance. In
17my basic model, I adopt one factor option pricing model and ﬁnd a closed-form solution
for bank equity in terms of asset-to-debt ratio. The results show that banks actually prefer
to use more capital even there are no capital requirements. Moreover, banks tend to take
lower risk instead of high risk no matter there are capital requirements or not, if they are
solvent. However, for insolvent banks, they may take riskier investment. Under the risk-
based capital requirements, banks would prefer lower capital requirements by taking lower
risk. Lastly, capital requirements only have impact on banks with low capital. For those
well capitalized banks, capital requirements will not aﬀect their behavior too much.
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